东道国政府干预条件下外资并购的市场结构效应被引量：6

Host Government Regulation and the Market Structure after Foreign Capital Mergers & Acquisition

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摘要外国企业在国内市场的地位不同,其并购国内企业之后将形成迥异的国内市场结构。本文通过一个开放经济条件下的Nash-Cournot模型,分析了外资并购中影响个体愿望和政府意志实现程度的若干决定因素。侧重研究了企业个体愿望与政府意志产生分歧的范围,在这一范围内,政府可以在审批程序中实施否决权来规制外资并购行为。进一步分析贸易条件对外资并购效应的影响,得到了政府通过宏观调控干预外资并购的机制。即政府如何调节贸易自由化程度来引导外资并购行为,以提高国内社会福利。 Abstract： Foreign firms have different market power in domestic market, so if they acquire domestic firms, different market structure will form. This paper analyzes factors that impact the private profit and the government objective through a NashCournot model. We get the possible range in which the private profit and the government objective conflict. Further, we analyze how the tariff impacts the effects of the foreign capital mergers ＆ acquisition. The conclusions form a government regulation mechanism according to which the authority adjusts the trade policy to improve the social welfare.

作者郑迎飞陈宏民

机构地区上海交通大学管理学院

出处《产业经济研究》 2006年第3期12-17,76,共7页 Industrial Economics Research

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目"中国企业兼并经济与社会效益问题实证研究"(项目编号:70372057)

关键词政府干预外资并购市场结构社会福利 government regulation foreign capital mergers ＆ acquisition market structure social welfare

分类号 F276.7 [经济管理—企业管理]

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