摘要
利用委托-代理关系分析政府官员(代理人)与公共权力的授予机构(委托人)在信息不对称条件下可能产生的腐败行为,通过委托人与代理人的博弈模型分析提出了防治该类腐败问题的策略。利用代理-寻利关系分析政府官员与行贿者的选择问题并提出了相应的防治对策。
According to the relation of consignation-agency when information is not equal between the governor （the agent） and the public power organization （the consigner）, this paper analyzes the possible corruptions. And by analyzing the game model of consigner-agent, the paper puts forward the common methods against this kind of corruption. Based on the relation of agent-benefit, the paper then analyzes the selection of governor and briber, and finds an approach to prevent the corrupt action.
出处
《金华职业技术学院学报》
2006年第2期26-29,33,共5页
Journal of Jinhua Polytechnic
关键词
腐败
委托-代理
代理-寻利
博弈
corruption
consignation-agency
agent-benefit
game
