摘要
政府供给偏好包括政府供给的规模偏好与结构偏好,它们是社会各方政治影响力相互冲突和竞争的结果。我们通过构建“执政能力函数”,从最简单的消费者集团与纳税人集团政治影响力制衡模型,到多集团、多政府供给项目下的政府供给结构决定模型,再到官僚控制下的政府供给偏好决定模型,逐步阐释了政治均衡决定资源配置的低效率属性,进而说明,相对于市场,政府供给规模和范围边界的收敛趋势会促进社会资源配置效率的改进。在我国当前社会经济转型过程中,政府供给偏好的形成具有更多的动态特征,从提高整个社会资源配置效率和建设和谐社会的目标来看,公共决策的民主化虽然能够在一定程度上缓解政治均衡的低效率,但无法从根本上消除政治均衡决定资源配置的低效率属性,因此我国当前政府职能转型的核心重点不在于公共决策的完全民主化,而在于协调政府供给范围调整与市场经济深化的进程和路径。公平竞争、自发扩展的市场经济秩序是市场“内生型”政府供给偏好形成的基础。
Public provision preference is the equilibrium of conflict and competition among political influence from multi-lateral interest groups. We establish an administration ability function to demonstrate the optimal behavior of the Party （or government） whose object is to gain maximum political support. Several cases such as consumer-taxpayer tradeoff, multi-group and multi-sources of provision from government; and bureaucracy control are discussed. We find the inefficient characteristic in political equilibrium; meanwhile the actual public provision preference and its change are determined by such political mechanism. China＇s fiscal transition is a dynamic process, so the co-evolution of market economy is a necessary condition for further efficiency improvement of government activities. We suggest the further reform should mainly emphasize on deepening a fair and competitive market economy but not an overall democracy.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第5期80-93,共14页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
政府供给偏好
政治价格
政治均衡
经济效率
public provision preference
political price
political equilibrium
economic efficiency
