摘要
公司治理问题有两类:一类是代理型公司治理问题,面对的是股东与经理之间的关系;另一类是剥夺型公司治理问题,涉及到大股东与小股东之间的利益关系。现代公司主要的特征是所有权与经营权相分离,产生了委托———代理关系。经过对传统的委托代理模型的分析认为:传统的委托———代理模型存在着假设条件———期望效用函数和股东财富最大化的不合理性,不具有可操作性。由此提出了龙格现象,设计了委托———代理区间化模型,并相应地提出了减小契约效力角,使委托人与代理人目标趋于一致,增加公司价值的两种方法:经理股票期权激励和加强独立董事建设。
Corporate governance problems include two types： one is the agent type corporate governance, facing relationship between stockholder and manager; the other type is the deprivation type corporate governance. And the main characteristic of modem corporate is the separation of ownership and management Power, appearing principal-agent relationship. Through analysis about traditional principal-agent model, finding out unreasonable factors, for example, expectation effectiveness function and the wealth maximum of stockholder. And it is infeasible. Because of these reasons, putting forward Runge phenomenon, designing a principal-agent range model. On base of this model, to make consignor and agent aim same, to increase corporate value, put forward two ways of reducing contract effective angle, including executive stock options and construction of independent director.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2006年第4期52-55,共4页
East China Economic Management
关键词
公司治理
委托-代理
龙格现象
corporate governance
principal-agent
runge phenomenon
