摘要
运用演化博弈理论研究了经济系统中机会主义行为的演化稳定性。结果表明,防范成本对于机会主义行为的演化起着至关重要的作用。若防范成本足够小,则即使只有部分个体采取防范措施,机会主义者也不能主宰系统。对于更高的防范成本,则只有所有的互惠主义者采取防范措施,才能阻止机会主义者主宰系统。若防范成本过大,则机会主义者将主宰系统。最后还在均衡状态下讨论了减少机会主义行为以及增加系统收益的策略和方法,得到了一些有益的结论。
This paper studies the evolution of opportunistic behavior by using evolutionary game theory. The results show that defense cost play an important role in evolution of opportunistic behavior. If defense cost is small enough, reciprocators and opportunists will coexist even if part reciprocators take defense measure. For higher defense cost, there is still a stable equilibrium consisting of opportunists and reciprocators when all reciprocators take defense measure. If and only if the defense cost is much too high, the opportunist will dominate the system. AdditionaUy, some strategies reducing opportunist and increasing market income are studied, and some beneficial results are gained.
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第1期28-33,共6页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
暨南大学人才引进科研启动基金资助项目(51104650)
关键词
演化博弈理论
演化稳定性
机会主义行为
evolutionary game theory
evolutionary stability； opportunistic behavior
