摘要
在国有企业的资产流动之中,由于将国有资产采用物权模式对待,过度依赖了评估机构,寻求所谓的“客观价值”,这是一种落后的静态的财产观念。这导致了中国的国有资产变成了对现值的讨价还价,忽略了转让后的期值,致使“国有资产管理”的治理模式变成了“一锤子买卖”。这种法律规则意味着国有资产变成了国家私产,是一种落后于时代的观念。国家并不是基于社会效率来持有国有资产的,国家利益替代了社会效率。采用合同的长期管理模式,完善文官制度,完善一般企业制度中的公司治理规则,本着社会本位的思想才能有效地调整和管理国有资产。
In this paper, the author points out that the theory in state owned capital （SOC） regulation takes a doctrine of continental law system＇s Rein right. In the transaction or privatization of State owned enterprise （SOE）, the legislator wants to find an effective way to determinate the objective value of assets or enterprise. The state treat the SOC as it＇s private property instead of public interest. The transaction model also turns a long-term cooperative mechanism into a once-off trade. Under this legislative model, opportunism behavior, fraud conveyance, tunneling and siphoning is eroding the state owned capital. The author also criticizes the legislative regime turn the public property into the state＇ s private property, the social efficiency but the national interest should be the aim of privatization, which means the law should not taking too much attention to the present value, but the social effects.
出处
《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期113-123,共11页
Science of Law：Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law
关键词
国有资产
转让对价
公司治理
公司法
国有企业法
公共企业
state-owned capital, corporation law, state-owned enterprise law, public enterprise, corporate governance
