摘要
应用博弈论方法,以流域管理机构征收水资源税为背景,研究了流域水资源开发利用冲突问题。首先分别按照各地区的个体理性和流域集体理性原则,建立了流域水资源开发利用冲突分析的完全非合作和合作博弈模型,分析了非合作和合作博弈情形的特点,然后在此基础上,基于流域管理机构以水资源税收作为激励和调控机制,建立动态一致性博弈模型,使得各地区在追求自身利益最优的情况下,同时也能够达到流域最优效益。
Against the background ot the institution ot river Dasm management levies water resources tax, the paper applies game theory to research the conflict in the basin water resources development. Firstly, according to the principles of local individual rationality of sub-areas, as well as the collective rationality of the basin, the paper presents a non-cooperative and cooperative model for the conflict analysis of basin water resources development, and analyzes the characters of non-cooperative and cooperative games. Secondly, on the basis of regarding the water resources tax as motivation and regulation of basin management institution, the paper presents the game model of dynamic consistency to realize the optimization of basin benefits, as well as the optimization of individual benefits of the sub-areas.
出处
《中国农村水利水电》
北大核心
2005年第9期24-27,30,共5页
China Rural Water and Hydropower
基金
南昌大学中国中部经济发展研究中心资助项目
关键词
水资源
博弈
个体理性
集体理性
合作
非合作
- water resources
game
individual rationality
collective rationality
cooperation
non-cooperation
