人力资本投资需求和供给的不对称性被引量：9

Asymmetry between Demand for and Supply of Human Capital Investment

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摘要为了获得递增的工资曲线,员工需要连续进行人力资本投资。雇佣关系的稳定性影响了员工的人力资本投资决策,那些与企业没有建立稳定雇佣关系的员工更偏好于投资一般性人力资本,而不是企业专用人力资本,企业则倾向于向那些雇佣关系稳定的员工提供一般性人力资本投资。通过对人力资本投资需求和供给的决定因素进行分析,可以得出结论:人力资本投资需求与供给中存在不对称性和不一致性。 In order to achieve an increasing wage profile, employees must constantly invest in human capital. Employment stability affects employees＇ decision- making of human capital investment. Employees having no stable employment relationships with firms prefer to invest in general human capital rather than finn-specific human capital. But, firms are inclined to provide general human capital investment for employecs with stable employment relationships with firms. This paper explores the determinants of demand for and supply of human capital investment, using data from recent survey. The results reveal that there is asymmetry and inconsistency between demand for and supply of human capital investment actually.

作者翁杰

机构地区浙江大学经济学院

出处《山西财经大学学报》 2005年第4期4-10,共7页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目<中国人力资本投资与劳动力市场管理研究>(项目编号70233003)的阶段性成果

关键词人力资本投资雇佣稳定性不对称性 human capital investment employment stability asymmetry

分类号 F014 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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参考文献14

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