摘要
研究目的:从政府、企业、农村集体及农户等征地主体行为角度,分析中国征地制度运行中各征地主体之间的相互关系,评价政府行使土地征用权的成本和收益以及由此而带来的农户及企业响应的成本和外在成本等。研究方法:法经济学理论与方法。研究结果:地方政府滥用征地权是追求自身利益最大化的结果,低标准补偿下农户行为给政府、企业、社会带来了较高的外在成本,导致征地效率损失。研究结论:法经济学理论和方法对征地制度改革和创新具有政策意义。
This paper aims to analyze the correlation between the land expropriation agents mostly from the behavior of governments, enterprises, rural collective and farmers, especially, appraises the costs and benefits for the operation of land expropriation system and systematically evaluates its external costs. Methods of law and economics theories and methods such as the cost- benefit analysis were used, which are applicable to the land expropriation system reform. The results indicate that the local governments misuse the land eminent domain to seek for their own interests. The farmers＇ behavior under the lower compensation criteria brings about the higher external costs for governments, enterprises and society and results in the inefficient land expropriation system. This paper concludes that law and economics theories and methods have some political meaning to the reform of land expropriation system.
出处
《中国土地科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第4期29-33,共5页
China Land Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70373060)
国家社会科学基金(03BJY034)
亚洲开发银行"中国征地移民风险管理能力建设"项目联合资助。
关键词
土地经济
征地主体行为
法经济学
改革
land economy
behavior of land expropriation agents
law and economics
reform
