摘要
从产出角度,在充分考虑了经营者人力资本的专用性和经营者的风险厌恶程度等因素的基础上,采用确定性等价方法对经营者人力资本进行定价.通过经营者人力资本价值信息,来确定对经营者的激励报酬数量.
Agency problems arise when a principal must hire an agent to manage his or her firm. One can eliminate these problems if the principal design an incentives compensation contract for executives. The paper deals with the pricing model of executive human capital from output viewpoint. Through positive tests,the certainty equivalent pricing model of the executive human capital is proved reasonable.
出处
《上海理工大学学报》
EI
CAS
北大核心
2005年第4期345-348,共4页
Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology
