摘要
基于一个新的委托-代理视角(将农户或农户合作经济组织看作委托人,将龙头企业看作代理人)来研究农户或农户合作经济组织与龙头企业相互博弈的过程和产生增收效应的机理。研究结果表明,在以分成制契约的框架下,由于农户合作经济组织能够更好地抵御不可抗力原因造成的风险,降低不守信的龙头企业再次寻找到合作方的概率,因此能够使参加农户合作经济组织的农户获得更多的利润分成。
This paper studies the game process between farmers or farmers' cooperative economic organizations and the leading enterprises,and the increased revenues effect of mechanism based on a new principal-agent model(farmers or farmers' cooperative economic organizations as the principal,and the leading enterprises as the agent).The results show that: farmers' cooperative economic organizations can resist the risk caused by force majeure and reduce the probability of leading enterprise of bad faith finding partners again,so the farmers in farmers' cooperative economic organizations can get more revenues under the framework of sharecropping contracts.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第12期89-92,共4页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901034)
教育部人文社会科学规划资助项目"农产品供应链质量安全监管研究--基于供应链成员间行为博弈的角度"
