摘要
考虑一个供应商与多个竞争的零售商组成的供应链,供应商销售单一产品给零售商,而零售商的市场需求量则依赖于这种商品的货架展示量。特别地,由于货架空间的稀缺,存货持有成本假设为非线性的成本函数以更符合实际的情况。假设市场需求由所有零售商的存货量之和确定,而市场分割则与他们各自的存货量相关。当零售商的成本相同时,存在唯一对称的Nash均衡解,供应商可以用价格加线性补贴的合同协调供应链;如果零售商的成本不同,供应商仍然可以用这种合同协调供应链,但是补贴多少应根据零售商的成本决定,最后通过数值算例说明所得结果。
Consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and ma ny competing homogeneous retailers. The supplier provides an item to the retaile rs facing demand rates which depend on the display space allocated to that produ ct. Specifically the shelf space cost is a non-linear function that is more rea listic for most retailing situations. Assumes that market demand depends on aggr egate inventory displayed, and then be divided between the firms proportional to their stocking quantity. If all the retailer's holding costs are same, we find the unique Nash equilibrium in this model, the supplier can use the price-plus -subsidy contract to coordinate the supply chain; when the retailer's holding c osts are not same, the supplier can also use this contract to coordinate the sup ply chain, but he need to decide the subsidy based on the retailer's holding cos t. Finally we analyze the results by conducting numerical examples.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2005年第3期70-75,共6页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金海外杰出青年基金资助项目(70028102)
关键词
协调
供应链
博弈论
coordination
supply chain
game theory
