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企业经营者报酬契约设计与激励强度分析

Analyses on Design of Payment Contract and Encouraging Intension of Managers
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摘要 构建市场起基础作用的企业经营者激励机制,实行企业经营者报酬契约的市场化是深化企业改革的必然选择。本文以委托代理理论为基础,引入企业经营者以其人力资本参与企业剩余分配和职位消费货币化的思想,以相对业绩比较信息屏蔽环境不确定性因素,以股价波动信息体现人力资本的市场价值,以市场评价标准确定的职位消费系数实现职位消费货币化,为完善企业经营者激励机制提供有益的借鉴。 It is critical choice for enterprises' reformation to build manager-encouraging system which market play a fundamental role and implement marketable manager payment contract. On the basis of principal-agent theory, we take the ideas of distributing the enterprises' surplus by human capital and monetary of staff-consumption, comparing the uncertainty factors in the information-shield environments by relative performance, reflecting the market value of human capital by the fluctuation information of stock prices and making the coefficient of staff-consumption by market-appraisal standard to perfect the managers' encouraging system.
作者 李劲松 刘瑜
出处 《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第5期48-50,共3页 Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词 报酬契约 市场化 职位消费系数 Payment Contract Marketable the Coefficient of Staff-consumption
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