摘要
本文从委托—代理理论出发 ,通过建立两个模型来分析中国家族企业经营权传递中的两个问题 ,即选择家族成员还是选择外人 ,以及在选择外人的情况下任何对其实施有效的激励。在模型中我们引入一系列假设 ,然后证明了其合理性 ,并指出改善这个模型的关键是改善人与人之间的信任关系。
Starting from the principal-agent theory,the article analyzes two problems of management right transfer of China family firms by establishing two models. The two problems are whether choosing family member or not,and how to provide incentive to outer members effectively when family firms choose them. The author quotes a series of hypothesis in the model,then testifies its rationality,moreover,the author points out the key of amending the model is improving interpersonal trust.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第5期6-10,共5页
Finance & Economics
关键词
家族企业
委托代理理论
激励
信息租金
Family firms
the Principal-agent theory
Incentive
Information rent
