We consider a bargaining problem between one buyer and one seller for a single object with two-type private values for each trader’s possible valuation. We characterize two sets of allocation mechanisms that are Baye...We consider a bargaining problem between one buyer and one seller for a single object with two-type private values for each trader’s possible valuation. We characterize two sets of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and expost individually rational, respectively. The result implies that there is almost no difference between two kinds of mechanisms. Finally, we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade. Journal of Economic Literature展开更多
文摘We consider a bargaining problem between one buyer and one seller for a single object with two-type private values for each trader’s possible valuation. We characterize two sets of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and expost individually rational, respectively. The result implies that there is almost no difference between two kinds of mechanisms. Finally, we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade. Journal of Economic Literature
