This study is seeking an answer as to whether the efficient state and the state under the rule of law are indeed irreconcilable, as well as to whether these two categories are by nature to be seen as contrary concepts...This study is seeking an answer as to whether the efficient state and the state under the rule of law are indeed irreconcilable, as well as to whether these two categories are by nature to be seen as contrary concepts. The basic issue is whether efficiency is to be handled as an ＂extralegal＂ category, or whether legal regulation, in accordance with public administration traditions in Europe, can in itself meet the requirement of efficiency. Also the study presents the formation of the issue of conflict between the effective state and the state under the rule of law in Hungary after the election held in 2010 in the practice of economic policy and legislation of the Orban government. We are trying to answer the question of the tendency of power concentration to really menace the principles of a traditionally-formed state under the rule of law, as well as whether the economic policy of the government can be implemented effectively in a strongly centralized political and state administrative system.展开更多
The corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies （SCLCs） has attracted much scholarly attention. Through reviewing the extant literature in this field, it is clear that the overwhelming majority...The corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies （SCLCs） has attracted much scholarly attention. Through reviewing the extant literature in this field, it is clear that the overwhelming majority is theoretically underpinned by the lens of agency costs. Another important perspective, adaptive efficiency, has yet to be equally emphasized by scholars. Reflecting on the experience of American venture capital （VC）, this article puts forth that the corporate governance of SCLCs has weakened the fundraising ability of Chinese domestic VC. Taking account of the positive link of a vibrant VC sector and the enhancement of adaptive efficiency, an obvious conclusion is that the corporate governance of SCLCs has already jeopardized the adaptive efficiency of the Chinese economy. Further, the normative implication of this finding is that the refined art of reforming the corporate governance of SCLCs ought to combine and harmonize agency costs with adaptive efficiency.展开更多
文摘This study is seeking an answer as to whether the efficient state and the state under the rule of law are indeed irreconcilable, as well as to whether these two categories are by nature to be seen as contrary concepts. The basic issue is whether efficiency is to be handled as an ＂extralegal＂ category, or whether legal regulation, in accordance with public administration traditions in Europe, can in itself meet the requirement of efficiency. Also the study presents the formation of the issue of conflict between the effective state and the state under the rule of law in Hungary after the election held in 2010 in the practice of economic policy and legislation of the Orban government. We are trying to answer the question of the tendency of power concentration to really menace the principles of a traditionally-formed state under the rule of law, as well as whether the economic policy of the government can be implemented effectively in a strongly centralized political and state administrative system.
文摘The corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies （SCLCs） has attracted much scholarly attention. Through reviewing the extant literature in this field, it is clear that the overwhelming majority is theoretically underpinned by the lens of agency costs. Another important perspective, adaptive efficiency, has yet to be equally emphasized by scholars. Reflecting on the experience of American venture capital （VC）, this article puts forth that the corporate governance of SCLCs has weakened the fundraising ability of Chinese domestic VC. Taking account of the positive link of a vibrant VC sector and the enhancement of adaptive efficiency, an obvious conclusion is that the corporate governance of SCLCs has already jeopardized the adaptive efficiency of the Chinese economy. Further, the normative implication of this finding is that the refined art of reforming the corporate governance of SCLCs ought to combine and harmonize agency costs with adaptive efficiency.
