Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager ins...Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations.Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China,we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts.We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises,whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship.Furthermore,we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives’on-the-job consumption.Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications.展开更多
本文从创始人不再兼任C E O,改由非创始人管理这一视角出发,探讨创业型民营企业在发展过程中出现的第一次内部分工对R&D活动的影响。研究发现,相比创始人管理的企业,非创始人管理的企业投入的R&D费用显著增加。同时,非创始人管...本文从创始人不再兼任C E O,改由非创始人管理这一视角出发,探讨创业型民营企业在发展过程中出现的第一次内部分工对R&D活动的影响。研究发现,相比创始人管理的企业,非创始人管理的企业投入的R&D费用显著增加。同时,非创始人管理下的R&D产出也更加丰富,为区分非创始人驱动R&D投资的私人利益追逐动机和专用性资产培育动机提供了证据。进一步地,我们检验了上述关系的中介效应(如专业人力资本的拥有和内部合约的优化),以及不同专用性资产转移成本和时间条件下非创始人管理对企业R&D投入影响的差异。展开更多
基金the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project 71602059,71872192,71602039)the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province,China(Project 2015A030310223,2016A030313482)the Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China(Project 15YJC630051).
文摘Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations.Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China,we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts.We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises,whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship.Furthermore,we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives’on-the-job consumption.Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications.
文摘本文从创始人不再兼任C E O,改由非创始人管理这一视角出发,探讨创业型民营企业在发展过程中出现的第一次内部分工对R&D活动的影响。研究发现,相比创始人管理的企业,非创始人管理的企业投入的R&D费用显著增加。同时,非创始人管理下的R&D产出也更加丰富,为区分非创始人驱动R&D投资的私人利益追逐动机和专用性资产培育动机提供了证据。进一步地,我们检验了上述关系的中介效应(如专业人力资本的拥有和内部合约的优化),以及不同专用性资产转移成本和时间条件下非创始人管理对企业R&D投入影响的差异。
