摘要
从股东合谋的视角,考察非控股股东董事对国企高管更换与业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,非控股股东董事显著增强国企董事长更换对业绩的敏感性,但其效果只存在于地区法律保护好、未发生关联交易与非国有股东制衡的公司;此外,研究还发现,更换董事长后公司业绩得以显著改善。这些结果表明构建防合谋的非控股股东董事机制才是提高国企治理效率的关键,从而为当前国企混合所有制改革提供有益借鉴。
The study examines whether directors from non-controlling shareholders have an effect on turnover-performance relationship in state-owned listed firms from the perspective of shareholders' collusion. Empirical evidences show that directors from non-controlling shareholders improve the effect of CEO change on the firm performance, which is, however, significant only for firms located in districts of high legal protection and for those without related party transaction with non-controlling shareholders or with the non-state second large shareholder. Additional analy ses show that firm performances are improved because of CEO change. The results indicate that the collusion-proof mechanism in establishing balanced structure is the key to improving corporate governance of SOE, providing reference for the current reform of mixed ownership in SOE.
作者
刘伟
燕波
LIU Wei;YAN Bo(Business School,Shantou University,Shantou,Guangdong 515063)
出处
《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
2019年第4期39-46,95,共9页
Journal of Shantou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目“股东合谋的形成、影响及防范机制研究”(13YJC630097)
广东省哲学社会科学“十二五”规划项目“股东合谋与股权制衡治理机制研究”(GD12YGL03)
广东省教育厅育苗工程项目“公司治理环境与企业捐赠行为研究”(WYM10094)
关键词
非控股股东董事
高管更换
合谋
国企改革
directors from non-controlling shareholders
CEO turnover
collusion
SOE reform
