In this paper we reanalyze Said’s(2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. ...In this paper we reanalyze Said’s(2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said(2011). This implies that the well-known "revenue equivalence theorem"holds true for Said’s(2011) dynamic model setting.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71171052)
文摘In this paper we reanalyze Said’s(2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said(2011). This implies that the well-known "revenue equivalence theorem"holds true for Said’s(2011) dynamic model setting.
