摘要
运用博弈论中的一级密封价格拍卖原理,研究了在排污权交易市场中,当各排污企业的风险态度不同时,企业的不完全信息竞价博弈模型;并得出投标人越多,风险偏好系数越大,卖方的期望收益越高的结论。
Based on the principle of the first-price sealed auction in the game theory, this paper studies the tradable market of the emission permit and establishes a bidding game model with incomplete information for enterprises when each emisssion enterprise poses different attitudes. It concludes that the more bids participate in the auction and the bigger coefficient risk preference the finns have, the higher the expected revenues can be obtained.
出处
《工业工程》
2006年第3期49-51,共3页
Industrial Engineering Journal
关键词
环境污染
排污权
博弈
一级密封价格拍卖
environmental pollution
emission permit
game
first-price sealed auction
