摘要
金融监管的设计是为了纠正市场失灵、保护存款人和投资者的利益,然而信息不对称条件下,监管者的目标会偏离这一社会目标,导致监管者提供有效监管的激励不足和监管的低效率。基于这一认识,本文通过建立存款人与监管部门、监管当局与金融机构三方的监管博弈模型,对金融监管中的激励问题进行了分析。结果表明,不同的信息结构决定着不同的监管激励水平,从而直接影响着监管效率和社会福利水平。信息不对称程度愈大,监管激励水平愈低,监管效率也就愈低。中国当前金融监管中的主要问题也正是监管者及金融市场的透明度较低而缺乏监管激励所致。因而我国金融监管改革的关键不在于是否从宏观层面加强或放松金融监管,而在于如何通过监管当局及金融市场的信息透明度建设为微观监管主体提供有效监管的激励。
Financial regulation is designed to make up for financial market failure and to protect interests of depositors and investors. But asymmetric information always leads to a deviation from this basic social purpose and results in insufficient incentive and low efficiency of regulation. Based on this knowledge, the paper analyses the incentive mechanism in financial regulation through building up the supervision game model involving depositors, supervisory departments, supervisory authorities and financial institutions. The result shows that information structure is decisive to the regulation incentive, thus directly affecting the supervision effects and social welfare. The more asymmetric the information, the lower the incentive and the less efficient the financial regulation. The major problem in the current financial supervision lies in the lower transparency and lack of supervision incentive in supervisors and financial market. Therefore the crucial reform of financial regulation is to form a micro supervision entity to provide effective supervision incentive through establishing information transparency by supervisory authorities and financial market more than to strengthen or loosen the macro-level financial supervision.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第7期26-34,共9页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部十五规划项目:"中央银行监管体系的构建与金融风险监管"(01JA790070)
关键词
信息结构
监管激励
监管透明度
information structure
regulation incentive
transparency of supervision
