摘要
建立了两个博弈模型,对防洪减灾领域内中央政府和地方政府的投资行为进行了模拟,并通过均衡分析说明了两者的相互作用和相互影响。分析表明,中央政府的防洪减灾投资不能达到诱导地方政府投资的目的,也无法实现最有效的资源配置。因此,中央政府应弱化防洪减灾投资人的角色,鼓励和刺激地方政府的防洪减灾投资,实现与防洪减灾的地方公共品属性相协调的防洪减灾投资机制。
This paper establishes two game models to stimulate the investment behaviour of the central government and a local government in flood hazard mitigation filed. Interaction between the two players is illustrated in the equilibrium analysis. It is shown that the central government investment fails to encourage local investment into flood hazard mitigation. Suggestions are then made that the central government should retreat from the role of dominant investor in flood hazard mitigation, encourage and stimulate local government to invest, and realize the flood hazard mitigation mechanism which coordinates with local public attributes.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第3期44-46,共3页
Soft Science
关键词
中央政府
投资
防洪减灾
博弈
central government
investment
flood hazard mitigation
game
