摘要
本文在一种委托—代理框架下研究了退耕还林工程在实施过程中所面临的激励不相容问题。文章首先探讨了退耕还林私人承包的社会理性。然后 ,文章给出了一个双重任务委托—代理模型 ,解释市场冲击如何会使农户的自利性经营行为偏离社会生态目标。接着 ,文章以陕西省退耕还林现状为研究背景对退耕还林工程实施中的激励不相容问题做出了进一步的经验分析。最后 ,文章从政府规制的角度提出了若干公共政策建议 ,以期提高退耕还林工程的实施效率。
The Cropland Conversion Program is an important public policy for improving ecological environment. Focusing on the arrangement of structure of property rights, the Program tries to establish a new contractual relationship between government and farmers so as to reduce negative externalities by cultivating activities and encourage the afforesting activities that are conducive to the improvement of ecological environment. Within the framework of principal-agent model, this paper studies incentive-incompatibility problems that may exist in the enforcement of the contract. Firstly, the paper makes an analysis on the social rationality of the contacting out. The analysis is followed by a model to show how market shocks may cause the behavior of farmers to be inconsistent as to the goal of the program. Then, taking The Cropland Conversion Program of Shannxi Province as a study case, the paper makes an empirical analysis on incentive-incompatibility problems facing the enforcement of specific public policies. Finally, the paper proposes a series of public regulation schemes in the hope that they can be used to improve the efficiency of the enforcement of the program.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第4期107-116,共10页
Economic Research Journal
基金
中国博士后科学基金的资助
