摘要
经理股票期权的盛行有其经济学根源。首先,现代企业是人力资本与非人力资本的一个特别的契约,人力资本的所有者有权分享企业剩余,经理股票期权激励机制突出了人力资本的价值。其次,所有权与经营权分离后,企业不可避免的面对由于信息不对称导致的委托-代理问题,经理股票期权给予经理人分享企业剩余的权利,从而将委托人的利益与代理人的利益联系起来,很好地解决了委托-代理矛盾。通过这两个方面的论述,阐明了经理股票期权激励机制产生的理论基础,为理解经理股票期权的涵义及在中国实际的运用作了必要的铺垫。
The theoretical background of executive stock option (ESO) is economics. First, modern enterprises are an integration of human capital and non-human capital. Human capital has the right to participate in the allocation of the residual of a firm. Second, with the separation of ownership and management, the principal agent problems exist. Because of the asymmetry of information, it becomes difficult for the owners to monitor the activities of managers. With ESO, the managers become residual claimers of the firm. The owners and the managers become to have common interest. In this paper, a depth discussion of the economic background of ESO is described. The understanding of the economic background of ESO is essential for the design of ESO in Chinese enterprises.
出处
《辽宁石油化工大学学报》
CAS
2004年第1期85-87,共3页
Journal of Liaoning Petrochemical University
