摘要
从信息不对称角度出发,运用信息经济学的相关理论,研究风险投资机构与风险企业之间的利益博弈.核心问题是研究由于信息不对称对风险投资机构产生的代理风险以及风险投资机构如何克服代理风险问题.得出的研究成果:对投资机构与风险企业之间的委托代理关系进行模型化,较为系统、全面的研究风险投资中的代理风险,利用定量的方法来分析、解决投资机构与风险企业之间的代理问题.得出一结论:用定理和定性方法证明契约设计、分阶段投资、有效的监督、灵活的股权设置、声誉机制的建立等激励机制对风险企业家具有良好的激励作用.
In the course of venture capital, venture capitalist and venture enterpriser forms the relationship of principal agent. Venture enterpriser has more information than the venture capitalist, which results in venture capitalist adverse selecting venture enterpriser and venture enterpriser′s moral hazard. In this paper information economics has been applied to the research of the game between venture capitalist and venture enterpriser. This paper tries to study venture capitalist's agency venture due to asymmetric information and how to conquer agency venture. It has following achievements: (1) simulation the relationship between venture capitalist and venture enterpriser as a model; (2) applying quantitative method and qualitative method to testify the validity of incentive mechanism, such as contract design, phases investment, effective wupervise, flexible stock proportion setting, report mechanism.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第1期19-24,共6页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70171021)
教育部高等学校优秀青年教师教学科研奖励项目
四川省杰出青年基金后续资助项目(126)
