摘要
一方面由于内部人的利益驱动 ,诸如追求较多的津贴、炒作股价以套利 ,使得作为内部人的经理存在操纵公司利润的动机和偏好 ;另一方面由于经理人拥有关于公司与其当前以及未来的收益流的信息 ,这些信息是当前和潜在的股东所不拥有的 (即在公司经理与股东间存在信息的非对称性 ) ,这就给经理人操纵利润创造了条件 ,所以上市公司在不同程度上存在利润操纵。信息非对称的程度越高 ,利润操纵的可能性就越大 ,而且利润操纵的程度也就越深。文章先介绍非对称信息与利润操纵间的关系 ,然后从经理人迎合股价炒作以获得资本利得的角度分析上市公司操纵利润的动因。
On the one hand owing to the driving of insiders’ interest such as recalling more compensation and managing stock price so as to acquire capital gain, the managers who are insiders have the incentive and preference to manipulate earnings. On the other hand owing to managers’ possessing private information about a firm and its current and prospective earnings streams that current and potential shareholders do not have(i.e., informations that managers and shareholders have are asymmetric), which may allow make them to rig earnings. So the listed corporation can manipulate earnings at different extent. The higher the extent of information asymmetry, the greater the possibility to manage earnings and the higher the increment. This paper introduce the relation between the asymmetric information and the earnings management, then analyze the incentive of listed corporation managing earnings from the point of view of managers’ catering to manage stock price to acquire capital gain.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第6期55-60,共6页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (70 14 2 0 11)
