摘要
运用成本——收益方法设计委托——代理激励机制 ,提出将代理人的每年收益的一部分作为抵押资产 ,得到有效的重复博弈长期激励机制 ,使代理成本最小化 。
This essay concerns mainly my research on the Principal-Agent problems and the incentive theory. The Principal-Agent problem, which is basic to the e nterprise, arises because of the fact that the principal and his agent have goal s not agreeable with each other, and that information is not symmetric between t hem. This paper is the designing of incentive mechanism and studies the optimum mortgage of a contract design. Many conclusions have been derived, e.g., by mort gaging agent the Principal can acquire more information relevant to agent′s beh avior and make the agent′s cost least.
出处
《中南民族大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2003年第4期82-84,共3页
Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities：Natural Science Edition
基金
武汉市社会科学资助项目
关键词
委托——代理
抵押
激励合同
principal-agent
mortgage
incentive mechanism
