摘要
我国银行与企业之间信贷合约的特点决定了合约的不完全性 ,这使得企业的违约成为可能 ,由信息不对称、企业产权不明晰、行政干预、银行事前激励和事后激励机制不足等原因引发的企业机会主义行为又使违约成为必然。主要从不完全合约的角度运用信息经济学的方法论述了企业违约行为产生的微观机理。
In our country, the characteristics of credit contracts between bank and firm decide that the contract is incomplete. This makes it possible for the firm to default .The opportunism behavior of the firm induced by asymmetric information makes the default become sure. From the angle of incomplete contract, this paper takes advantage of the information economics approach to analyze the microcosmic mechanism that causes the firm to default.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报》
CAS
CSCD
2004年第1期99-102,共4页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology
关键词
违约
不对称信息
不完全合约
default
asymmetric information
incomplete contract
