中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析被引量：138

An Empirical Analysis of Agent Cost in China SOEs

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摘要我们运用“2 0 0 2年国有企业改制调查”中的激励工资数据 ,按Broyden Fletcher Goldfarb Shanno的最大似然估计模拟程序 ,对中国国有企业代理成本的规模、原因做了估计与分析。结果发现 ,中国国有企业的代理成本 ,相当于 60 %— 70 %的利润潜力。也就是说 ,在现存的国有企业体制下 ,代理成本使企业效率只达到了 3 0 %— 40 % !委托人 (政府的国资管理机构 )对客观随机冲击θ、代理人风险规避参数r及努力的边际成本递增率 η缺乏充分信息所产生的代理成本占总代理成本的 2 3 ;而由代理人风险规避所导致的代理成本占 1 3。模拟估算的结果显示 ,采取租赁、出售或租售国企的方式 ,大约可以使利润潜力的利用率增加 2 0个百分点 ;若要降低契约的信息成本 ,则应该在财产所有权与控制权上努力实现分权化。 Based on a data set of “Survey on China SOEs' Reform” in 2002, and according to maximum likelihood estimation process of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno, we estimate the agent cost of China SOEs. Overall, the total agent cost caused about 60—70 percent loss of potential profit! At the estimated parameters the cost of worker risk aversion is about one-third of total agent cost, and incomplete information accounted for other two-third of the agent cost. Therefor e, selling out SOEs to agents who are risk neutral might result in 20 percent increase in firms' profit, and decentralization of control right in SOEs would also improve economic efficiency.

作者平新乔范瑛郝朝艳

机构地区北京大学中国经济研究中心

出处《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第11期42-53,共12页 Economic Research Journal

基金福特基金会"公共政策研究项目"之"中国国有企业的激励与交易成本"研究项目中的主要成果

关键词中国国有企业代理成本产权制度内部契约制度激励性契约结构模型 Incentive Contract Agent cost State-eowned-enterprises

分类号 F276.1 [经济管理—企业管理] F224.0 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献17

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二级参考文献5

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