设计有效的存款保险制度被引量：42

On the Effective Deposit Insurance System

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摘要虽然存款保险会带来道德风险,使得商业银行更倾向于从事风险性的活动,但是审慎的监管措施和激励相容的保险合同可以消除道德风险带来的不利影响。分析表明,具有如下特征的存款保险制度能够加强市场的惩罚机制,降低金融体系的风险,即有限的保险范围,较低的保险限额,风险调整的保费,私人经营保险基金以及强制性会员资格。文章建议,中国应该取消隐性的存款保护,建立小额有限的存款保险制度,这不但有利于保护小额存款者的利益,而且有利于完善金融机构的救助机制和市场退出机制。 Deposit insurance, which encourages banks to finance high - risk projects, is a source of moral hazard. However,prudent supervisions and incentive-compatible insurance contract can offset the negative effect of moral hazard. In practice, deposit insurance system can strengthen market dis- cipline and lower the risk of the financial system if it has the following characteristics, such as limited coverage, risk-adjusted premium, compulsory membership and fund administrated by private agents. The paper suggests that China should abolish a full implicit guarantee for deposits, and establish a explicit deposit insurance system with limited coverage, which is not only beneficial to protect small depositors, but also to improve bailout mechanism and market exiting mechanism for financial institutions.

作者北京大学中国经济研究中心宏观组

机构地区北京大学中国经济研究中心

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第11期1-16,共16页 Journal of Financial Research

关键词存款保险银行挤兑道德风险 deposit insurance, bank run, and moral hazard

分类号 F830.1 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献23

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