摘要
国有产权不可分割性的特质决定了国有经济委托人不拥有合法的个人产权 ,不是具体的人格化的个体 ,难以对其机会主义行为实施惩罚机制 ,所以 ,国有产权委托人缺乏努力设计和改进公司治理结构等克服委托 -代理问题的制度安排的内在激励 ,也就很难建立起现代公司治理结构。公司治理结构现代化是个体化、人格化清晰产权的结果 ,而重构个体化、人格化清晰产权又与国有产权不可分割的特质不相容 ,因此 ,国有产权存在着建立现代公司治理结构的困境。
The indivisible nature of state-owned property rights determines that the principals of state-owned economy have no legal individual property rights, they are not personalized legal persons, and it is hard to establish a mechanism to punish their opportunistic behavior. Therefore, the principals have no incentives to design or improve institutional arrangements, including corporate governance, which can contribute to overcoming principal-agent problems; hence, the foundation of modern corporate governance loses the basement. Modern corporate governance derives from clear personalized and individual property rights, which are incompatible to the character of state-owned property rights. Based on the analysis above, we can make a conclusion that it is a plight to establish modern corporate governance under state-owned property rights.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第6期71-74,共4页
Finance & Economics
关键词
国有产权
现代公司治理结构
委托-代理关系
state-owned property rights modern corporate governance principal-agent relation
