摘要
许多经济关系与经济结构都以一个长期并且动态的合约为基础.动态合约理论在经济学及管理学的相关领域里应用广泛.在此,简略地介绍三个动态合约模型,并对它们在CEO薪酬方面的应用作直接的推演.这篇短文的另一个目的是为感兴趣的读者介绍动态合约理论的一些基本研究手段.
Many economic institutions are based on a longterm contract. Dynamic contract theory is a useful tool for analyzing a variety of economic issues. This essay reviews three formal models of dynamic contracts in the context of CEO compensation. These models show that dynamic contract theory has interesting implications for understanding the observed CEO compensation dynamics and for the optimal design of CEO incentive contracts.
出处
《复旦学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第5期655-663,共9页
Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science
关键词
动态合约
激励
CEO薪酬
dynamic contracts
incentives
CEO compensation
