摘要
本文是来自于中国近年来实行民营化改制实践的一个理论结晶。该研究在中国特定的渐进改革基础上 ,讨论了民营化发生的原因和阻力 ,以及国有企业的利益相关者在改制过程中的利益权衡行为 ,并根据它们的相互关系和目标行为建立了民营化的均衡模型。模型的核心是企业家的最优目标函数 ,这是关系到企业能否实现成功改制的关键。模型的约束条件反映了利益相关者的基本利益保障 ,不会由于改制而受到损害。因此 ,均衡条件的满足表明了最优化改制的实现。通过对模型的分析发现 ,能够满足民营化最优均衡的退出条件 ,就是国有企业退出的最佳时机选择。企业净资本价值、企业家对股权的收购值与职工补偿值之间的合理比例的区间 ,是形成民营化均衡模型的最优解的取值范围。模型的政策含义在于纠偏作用 ,尤其是政府实际的退出时机与改制均衡的最佳退出时机的不一致 ,对于职工利益的损害或缺乏企业家最优目标行为的改制 ,都是脱离了最优轨道的结果 。
This paper is a theoretical summary for privatization practice of Chinese State-owned enterprises during last five years.Based on specific background of Chinese restructure of property rights,the research discussed the relationship of stakeholder of state-owned enterprises and their choice.According to their behavior and trade-off,the equilibrium model for privatization has been built.The core of the model is optimal target function of entrepreneur,and also it is the key to concern the successful restructure.The constraints of the model reflect the basic guarantee of stakeholders.Therefore,satisfied the equilibrium conditions,the optimal restructure could be reached.The important finding from the model is as following.The optimal solution of privatization model depends on the timing for exit of state-owned enterprises.The best opportunities for exit are in the reasonable proportion for firm net fixed assets,share value of entrepreneur purchasing and compensations for employees.The policy implication of the model provides one of the optimal transition frameworks.Any restructure,which would hurt employee's basic interests or would be lack of the entrepreneur's optimal target conduct,could have been away from the optimal equilibrium transition path.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第9期21-31,共11页
Economic Research Journal
基金
中国社会科学院B类重点项目
美中文化交流协会福特基金招标项目的成果之一
