浅议风险投资的激励约束机制被引量：1

Probe into Incentive Mechanisms Between Venture Capitalists and Innovating Enterprises

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摘要风险投资企业与风险企业之间存在突出的信息不对称,可能导致严重的委托-代理问题和道德风险,对此,可通过甄别机制、契约机制、分期投资机制、对管理层特殊的薪酬机制和企业治理机制等实现风险投资企业对风险企业的激励与约束。 The incentive and constraint mechanisms between venture capitalist and innovating; enterprises include screening,contracting,periodically investing,special governance structure,etc.

作者王一鸣

机构地区宁波联合集团股份有限公司

出处《科技进步与对策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第8期105-107,共3页 Science & Technology Progress and Policy

关键词风险投资激励约束机制风险企业企业治理机制薪酬机制道德风险 venture capital venture incentive mechanisms

分类号 F830.59 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献1

1罗海平.美国风险资本运营的微观监控机制及其借鉴[J].世界经济,2001,24(7):50-54. 被引量：6

二级参考文献6

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