摘要
交通诱导是交通管理者、驾驶员等交通参与者之间的一个博弈过程,在这个过程中,每个驾驶员根据所拥有的信息修正自己的行为策略以提高盈利,从而构成交通诱导演化中的宏观结构与驾驶员的微观行为之间互相影响的自组织现象。本文应用演化博弈论对交通诱导演化过程进行了分析,建立了诱导条件下驾驶员路径选择行为的演化模型,并对其进行分析以求为建立实用的诱导策略提供理论支持。
The traffic flow guidance is a game process ,during which every driver is continually ameliorating his strategy in order to get more benefit. Accordingly, the self-organization happens between marco-structure of the traffic flow guidance and the micro-activity of drivers. The evolutionary process of traffic flow guidance is analyzed using evolutionary game and the evolutionary model of route choice behavior of drivers is proposed and analyzed in order to provide theoretic support for guidance strategy in this paper.
出处
《交通运输系统工程与信息》
EI
CSCD
2003年第2期23-27,共5页
Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金
国家杰出青年基金(60125310)
