摘要
本文对中国上市公司的管理层收购(MBO),从方式、定价、资金来源、财富效应以及公司绩效等诸方面进行了全样本实证分析,并结合国外的理论实践作了对比评论。通过对累计异常收益CAR、每股收益、资产收益率等指标的计量,发现中国上市公司的MBO并未提高公司绩效,股东财富效应也不显著,且存在违反"公开、公平、公正"三公原则的行为,同时指出目前有关配套措施亦不完善,从而得出慎行上市公司MBO的结论。
Making an empirical analysis on the MBO behavior of the management of listed companies in China from such aspects as methods,pricing,sources of fund,fortune effects and corporate performance etc.,the paper comments on the comparison between the theories and practices of other countries and that of China. By means of calculating cumulative abnormal returns(CAR),EPS and ROA,the author finds that MBO of listed companies in China does not enhance corporate performance and that the fortune effects of shareholders are not obvious.On the contrary,there exist behaviours against the three principles of 'openness,fairness and equality' and corresponding necessary measures are imperfect at present.It concludes that it is not proper to have MBO listed companies now in China.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第5期45-51,共7页
Journal of Finance and Economics
