摘要
在电力市场环境下 ,发电厂商的目标是其自身利益最大化 ,而不是社会福利最大化 ,故有必要研究电力市场定价方法对发电厂商策略性报价的诱导机理 ,进而引导发电厂商进行成本和服务的竞争 ,而不是策略的竞争。文中分析了 3种定价方法下发电厂商的价格决策和产量决策。在价格决策方面 ,统一出清电价和 PAB(按报价支付 )电价方法下 ,发电厂商均有偏离成本报高价的倾向 ;在实用当量电价方法下 ,证明了发电厂商所得的支付电价不敏感于报价 ,并且其最优报价策略是按真实成本报价。在产量决策方面 ,统一出清电价方法下 ,发电厂商可利用市场力通过持留发电容量获取超额利润 ;而在 PAB和当量电价方法下 ,持留容量都将导致发电厂商利润损失。因此 ,从定价方法对发电厂商报价策略的诱导机理来看 ,当量电价方法要优于统一出清电价和 PAB定价方法。
In an electricity market, the objective of a power supplier is not social welfare maximization but its own profit maximization. It is necessary to study the effect of different pricing methods on the bidding strategies of power suppliers. Power suppliers' price decision and production decision are studied in this paper. In the aspect of price decision-making, under uniform and PAB (pay as bid) pricing methods, power suppliers tend to bid above their true costs. It is also proved that under the electricity value equivalent (EVE) pricing method, the payments to power suppliers are not sensitive to their bids, and the best bidding strategy is to bid the true cost. In the aspect of production decision-making, under the uniform pricing method, some power suppliers can obtain excessive profit by withholding generation capacity. Under PAB and EVE pricing methods, power suppliers will lose their profits if they withhold generation capacity. In the aspects of the inducement to power suppliers' strategic bidding, EVE pricing method is better than the uniform and PAB pricing methods.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第5期20-25,共6页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目 (5 993715 0 )~~
