摘要
供应链企业间由于信息不对称而存在委托代理问题,分析委托代理问题及道德风险的产生,建立相应的防范模型,并结合供应链实际作出风险分担和激励机制的设计方案,对于降低企业风险具有重要参考价值。
Enterprises engaged in supply chain are faced with principal-agent problems because of information asymmetry. This paper analyzes the problems of the principal-agent and the causes of moral hazard, sets up the guarding model and makes some designs for the risk shaning and incentive mechanism regarding the practical supply chain situations. There will be important reference value to cutting down risks that enterprises may meet.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2003年第9期103-105,共3页
Commercial Research
关键词
供应链
企业
委托代理
问题
道德风险
风险防范
supply chain
principal-agent
moral hazard
incentive mechanism
guarding model
