摘要
本文运用一个企业融资的不完备契约模型,分析了股权融资和债权融资下企业控制权安排对经营管理者努力激励的影响。分析的结果表明,在企业投资项目的预期现金流收益存在不确定性的情况下,企业单独利用股权融资或债权融资都有可能降低经营管理者的努力水平;提高经营管理者努力水平的融资安排是股权融资和债权融资并举,并且,为避免两种融资方式并存下企业控制权配置可能带来的股东与债权人的利益冲突,必须设计一个有效的企业控制权转移机制。
By using an incomplete contract model of corporate financing this paper a nalyses the effects of corporate control rights design on the effort i ncentives of managers under equity f inancing and debt financing.If the c ash flows of the project are uncertain equity f inancing or debt financing may cause the decreasing of the effort incenti ve of managers.The financing design of eq uity financing and debt financing wo rking together should increase the e ffort incentives of managers effectively.However,in order to avoid the confl icts of interests between sharehold ers and debtors,an effective mechanism of c orporate control rights should be designed.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第3期75-79,共5页
China Soft Science
