摘要
建立了一个两时期基于信号博弈的声誉模型.有两个参与人进行博弈,拥有私人信息的参与人叫发送者,另一个不拥有私人信息的叫接收者;该声誉模型研究L类(低能力类型)发送者是否有动机在第一时期建立声誉.证明显示,如果L类发送者在第一时期建立声誉,则他在第二时期的最优信号更大,在第一时期的效用更小,但是,他将在第二时期获得更高的效用.
This paper sets up a two_period reputation model based on signaling game. There are two players in the game, the one is sender with private information, and the other is receiver without private information. The reputation model studies the type L senders to see whether they have motive to set up reputation in period one or not. We show that the optimal signal of the type L sender is larger in the period two if he sets up reputation in the period one. The utility of the type L sender is less in the period one if he sets up reputation in the period one, but he will get the higher utility in the period two.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
2003年第1期27-31,共5页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171028
70071049
79830010).
