摘要
人工智能主体问题的核心争议在于机器能否拥有类似人的独立意识这一基本难题。爱尔兰作家贝克特在其小说《无法称呼的人》中,从存在主义视角引出了其小说主角的茫然和困惑,并将其称为“无法称呼的主体”,以此揭示主体的存在与虚无之间的关系。与贝克特不同,胡塞尔的现象学将意向性视为主体的核心特征;以拉康和齐泽克为代表的精神分析理论则认为主体是匮乏的、分裂的和“误认的”,是依托幻象与驱力形成的悖论性主体。现代人工智能再次使主体问题复杂化了:脑机接口这个由肉体与芯片组成的脑机混合体,既非传统哲学意义上的主体,亦非纯粹数字意义上的智能机器,而是贝克特笔下的“无法称呼”的主体。因此,如何界定和看待脑机混合体就成为现代哲学不可回避的问题。
The core controversy regarding the subject problem of artificial intelligence lies in the fundamental question of whether machines can possess human-like independent consciousness.In his novel The Unnamable,Irish writer Samuel Beckett,from an existentialist perspective,evokes the bewilderment and confusion of his novel’s protagonist,and refers to him as the“unnamable subject,”thereby revealing the relationship between the subject’s existence and nothingness.Unlike Beckett,Husserl’s phenomenology regards intentionality as the core feature of the subject;psychoanalytic theories represented by Lacan andŽižek hold that the subject is lacking,split,and“misrecognized,”a paradoxical subject formed by relying on fantasy and drive.Modern artificial intelligence has once again complicated the subject problem:the brain-computer interface,a human-machine hybrid composed of flesh and chips,is neither a subject in the traditional philosophical sense nor a purely digital intelligent machine,but rather the“unnamable”subject depicted by Beckett.Therefore,how to define and view the brain-computer hybrid has become an unavoidable issue in modern philosophy.
作者
孔明安
王馨雨
Kong Ming’an;Wang Xinyu
出处
《山东社会科学》
北大核心
2026年第1期84-93,共10页
Shandong Social Sciences
基金
国家社科基金项目“当前主要社会思潮的最新发展动态及其批判研究”(项目编号:16ZDA101)的阶段性成果。
