摘要
针对碳达峰碳中和背景下电动汽车快速增长与充电设施供给不足之间的矛盾,以及因信息不对称导致的电动汽车无序充电问题,研究聚焦于充电站容量有限场景,旨在通过优化运营策略提升充电站效益,并保障大规模电动汽车的充电需求。为此,提出一种基于多电动汽车聚合商的博弈运营方法:构建聚合商与电动汽车之间的主从博弈模型,实现双方信息交互与电价动态制定;在此基础上,根据用户事先提交的调度意愿,对接受跨站调度的电动汽车建立充电站间的合作博弈模型,以优化充电资源分配;最终,采用Shapley值法对联盟产生的额外收益进行公平分配。仿真结果表明,所提策略可使充电站整体收益较基于日前电价的基准策略提升约103%,同时促进电动汽车在各充电站间的均衡分布,既增强了充电站的经济性,又有效缓解了因局部充电需求过载导致的供需失衡问题。本研究为充电基础设施不足场景下的运营模式提供了新思路,有助于推动电动汽车产业健康发展和“双碳”目标的实现。
In the context of“carbon peak and carbon neutrality”,the rapid growth of electric vehicles(EVs)has created a mismatch with the insufficient supply of charging infrastructure,leading to disorderly charging behaviors that pose various challenges to the power grid.Focusing on scenarios with limited charging station capacity,this study aims to enhance the economic benefits of charging stations while meeting the charging demands of a large number of EVs through optimized operational strategies.To this end,a multi-EV aggregator gaming operation method is proposed.Firstly,a Stackelberg game model between aggregators and EVs is established to enable information interaction and dynamic electricity pricing.Based on users’pre-submitted willingness to be dispatched,a cooperative game model among charging stations is constructed for EVs that accept cross-station dispatch,optimizing the allocation of charging resources.Finally,the Shapley-value method is employed to fairly distribute the additional profits generat-ed by the coalition.Simulation results show that the proposed strategy can increase the overall profit of charging stations by approx-imately 103%compared to the baseline strategy based on day-ahead electricity prices,while also promoting a balanced distribution of EVs among charging stations.This approach not only enhances the economic performance of charging stations but also effectively mitigates supply–demand imbalances caused by localized charging overloads.This research provides new insights into operational models for scenarios with insufficient charging infrastructure,contributing to the healthy development of the EV industry and the achievement of dual-carbon goals.
作者
叶萌
张扬
张凡
谭俊丰
汤君博
陈皓勇
YE Meng;ZHANG Yang;ZHANG Fan;TAN Junfeng;TANG Junbo;CHEN Haoyong(Guangzhou Power Supply Bureau of Guangdong Power Grid Co.,Ltd.,Guangzhou 510510,China;China Southern Power Grid Digital Power Grid Research Institute Co.,Ltd.,Guangzhou 510700,China;South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)
出处
《供用电》
北大核心
2026年第3期89-98,122,共11页
Distribution & Utilization
基金
国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFB2403500)
中国南方电网有限责任公司重大科技项目(GDKJXM20220333)。
关键词
电动汽车聚合商
运营策略
主从博弈
合作博弈
SHAPLEY值
electric vehicle aggregators
operational strategies
Stackelberg game model
cooperative game model
shapley-value
