摘要
本文聚焦市场竞争与信息传导的视角,探究金融监管对企业并购溢价的影响。基于2010—2023年中国A股上市公司数据,考察以2018年《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》修订为代表的一系列针对经营者集中审查制度变化的政策效应,研究发现该系列政策的变化通过加强经营者集中审查,显著抑制了过高的并购溢价。机制分析表明,一方面,监管降低了行业集中度,削弱企业通过并购形成垄断势力的预期,抑制了因追求市场支配地位产生的高溢价;另一方面,提高信息传导效率,提升信息透明度,降低投资者与并购方的信息不对称,引导投资者情绪理性化,减少信息不透明导致的溢价高估风险。本文将并购溢价研究从企业内部行为拓展至外部竞争环境,验证了经营者集中审查在抑制高溢价并购中的作用,为监管层优化竞争秩序、抑制不合理并购溢价提供了理论支持与实证依据,丰富了并购溢价形成机制及政策影响的研究。
This paper explores the impact of financial regulation on corporate merger and acquisition(M&A)premiums from the perspective of market competition and information transmission.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China spanning the period 2010-2023,it examines the policy effects of a series of adjustments to the operator concentration review regime,with particular reference to the 2018 revision of"Provisions of the State Council on the Standard for Declaration of Concentration of Business Operators".It is found that these policy changes have significantly curbed excessive merger premiums through the strengthening of operator concentration reviews.Mechanism analysis demonstrates that,on the one hand,regulation reduces industry concentration,diminishing corporate expectations of forming monopolistic power through mergers,thereby suppressing high premiums driven by the pursuit of market dominance.On the other hand,it improves information transmission efficiency and enhances transparency,thereby mitigates information asymmetry between investors and acquirers,fosters rational investor sentiment,and lowers the risk of premium overestimation caused by opaque information.By extending the study of M&A premiums from internal corporate behaviors to external competitive environments,this paper validates the role of concentration reviews in restraining inflated M&A premiums.It offers theoretical support and empirical evidence for regulators to optimize competitive order and curb unreasonable premiums,enriching the understanding of the mechanisms underlying M&A premium formation and the effects of policy interventions.
作者
杨璐
王乾坤
许恒
YANG Lu;WANG Qian-kun;XU Heng(School of Economics,Minzu University of China,Beijing 100081,China;School of Business,China University of Political and Law,Beijing 100088,China)
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
北大核心
2026年第1期74-92,共19页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(22BJY116)。
关键词
并购溢价
经营者集中申报
金融监管
市场竞争
反垄断
merger premium
operator concentration declaration
financial regulation
market competition
antitrust policy
