摘要
2015年我国债券市场首次出现国有企业债券违约,标志着政府的隐性担保效应明显减弱,公司融资风险提高。本文利用各省份首次出现地方国有企业债券违约事件作为打破政府隐性担保的外生冲击,采用三重差分法实证检验政府隐性担保的打破对企业会计信息披露的影响。研究发现,在隐性担保打破后,国有企业杠杆操纵程度显著上升。机制分析表明,隐性担保打破通过融资约束机制和财务困境机制,诱发了国有企业的杠杆操纵行为。异质性分析表明,当企业现金持有较低和企业债务违约风险较高时,隐性担保打破带来的负面冲击更大,表现为杠杆操纵程度更高。此外,本文还发现隐性担保打破后,杠杆操纵程度高的国有企业管理层为减少职业风险而降低了过度债务融资程度,表明债务的市场资源配置效应开始显现。本文通过对债券刚兑被打破后企业的信息披露策略进行研究,发现隐性担保效应的打破有利于市场化机制的建立,但也要考虑政策的弹性空间,当企业面临高额债务时不能一刀切式的降低,要考虑企业的承受力更要考虑如何有效“纾解”。
In 2015,the Chinese bond market witnessed its first default on a state-owned enterprise(SOE)bond,signaling a pivotal shift in government policy away from providing implicit guarantees for all SOE bonds.This signaled a weakening of the government's implicit guarantee effect and an increase in corporate financing risks.This paper employs the triple difference method to empirically examine the impact of the reduced implicit government guarantee on corporate accounting information disclosure.The study finds that,based on statistically significant Cumulative Abnormal Returns(CAR),the breakdown of implicit government guarantees at the provincial level has indeed led to adverse market reactions for local state-owned enterprises.Our findings indicate that after the breakdown of the implicit guarantee,the degree of leverage manipulation by SOEs significantly increased.The mechanism analysis reveals that the breakdown of implicit government guarantees prompts state-owned enterprises to manipulate their leverage ratios through two primary channels:the financing constraints mechanism and the financial distress mechanism.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the breakdown of implicit guarantees exerts a more pronounced adverse effect on firms characterized by lower cash holdings and heightened default risk,manifested in a higher degree of leverage manipulation.Furthermore,this study reveals that after the breakdown of implicit guarantees,managers of highly leveraged SOEs reduce the degree of excessive debt financing because of career concerns,indicating that the market resource allocation effect of debt is beginning to emerge.This paper also rules out alternative explanations related to deleveraging policies and credit risk contagion within the same industry.By examining corporate information disclosure strategies following bond defaults,it is found that breaking the implicit guarantee effect facilitates the establishment of a market-driven mechanism,but consideration must be given to the flexibility ofpolicy implementation.In addressing high corporate debt levels,a one-size-fits-all approach cannot effectively resolve these issues;rather,tailored strategies are needed to genuinely'alleviate'the problem.
出处
《会计研究》
北大核心
2025年第11期137-149,共13页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072093,72472074)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(22YJC790178)的支持。
关键词
国有企业
债券
隐性担保
杠杆操纵
融资约束
State-owned Enterprises
Bond
Implicit Guarantee
Leverage Manipulation
Financing Restrain
