摘要
文章以2007—2023年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证研究董责险对分类转移盈余管理的影响。研究发现:董责险负向影响分类转移盈余管理,且与分类转移费用操纵相比,董责险对分类转移收入操纵的负向作用更为显著;机构投资者持股有助于强化董责险对分类转移盈余管理的抑制作用,而过高的独立董事占比会弱化董责险对分类转移盈余管理的抑制作用。异质性分析表明,国有企业和地区法制水平高的上市公司购买董责险能更加有效地抑制分类转移盈余管理。研究结论为甄别上市公司盈余质量、推动资本市场高质量发展提供了有益借鉴。
This study takes A‑share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2023 as samples to empirically examine the impact of D&O on CSEM.The findings reveal that D&O exerts a negative impact on CSEM,with its negative effect on revenue manipulation more pronounced than that on expense manipulation.In addition,institutional investor shareholding reinforces the inhibitory effect of D&O on CSEM,while an excessively high proportion of independent directors weakens this effect.Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that for state‑owned enterprises and listed companies in regions with a high legal system level,their D&O adoption can more effectively suppress CSEM.The research findings provide a useful reference for identifying the earnings quality of listed companies and advancing the high‑quality development of the capital market.
作者
马巾英
周敏
Ma Jinying;Zhou Min(School of Business,Hunan Normal University,Changsha,Hunan 410081,China)
出处
《长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2026年第1期83-93,共11页
Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology(Social Science)
基金
湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会基金项目(XSXSP20YBZ004)。
关键词
董责险
分类转移盈余管理
操纵手段
机构投资者持股
独立董事占比
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O)
classification shifting earnings management(CSEM)
manipulation methods
institutional investor shareholding
proportion of independent directors
