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官员晋升联动

Co-promotion between Higher-and Lower-level Government Leaders in China
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摘要 在自上而下政府管理制度下,上级政府和下级政府组成行政组织系统,当上级政府官员晋升到更高级政府的重要职位后,他们可能利用人事职权倾向于提拔原组织系统的下级政府官员,从而形成上级政府官员晋升带动下级政府官员晋升的局面。本文基于身份认同理论,创新性提出上下级政府官员晋升联动假说,利用1983—2020年江苏省的市委书记和县级主政官员数据检验该假说。以市委书记晋升为省部高官作为市下辖县县官面临的外生冲击,基于双重差分法识别策略的实证结果表明,市委书记晋升为省部高官第1年、第2年能够显著提升原任职市下辖县县官晋升概率,经验证据支持理论假说。机制分析表明,市委书记晋升为省部高官后,与其有共事关系的原任职市下辖县县官有更高晋升概率,揭示出上下级官员晋升联动的驱动力是建立在实际交往之上的社会关系网络。 Based on the theory of identity,the paper puts forward the hypothesis of co-promotion between higher-and lower-level government leaders and tests this hypothesis by using the data of prefectural party secretaries and county leaders(county party secretaries and county heads)in Jiangsu province in the period 1983—2020.Employing the difference-in-differences empirical strategy,the results show that in the first and second year after prefectural party secretaries are promoted to important administrative positions in provinces or central ministries,the probability of promotion for county leaders increases significantly.Mechanism analysis shows that with the promotion of prefectural party secretaries,county leaders who used to work together with them have higher probability of promotion,indicating that social network built on actual contacts is the driving force of the co-promotion between higher-and lower-level government leaders.
作者 吴延兵 Yanbing Wu(Institute of Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;School of Economics,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
出处 《经济学报》 2025年第4期50-68,共19页 China Journal of Economics
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