摘要
中国以新能源汽车、锂电池、光伏产品为代表的高技术产品出口激增,源于自身完整产业体系、超大规模市场和持续技术创新的比较优势,是由开放经济条件下需求增加驱动的,而非依靠政府补贴。当前,美国等西方国家针对中国的“产能过剩”指责,折射出其对中国竞争力崛起的战略焦虑,其真实动机是试图通过限制中国在新能源领域的国际竞争力,维护其在全球产业链中的主导地位,体现了泛安全化背景下全球经济治理的大国博弈。从全球经济治理博弈的视角出发,通过产能利用率、销售渗透率等实证数据分析,批驳“产能过剩论”的理论谬误和现实矛盾,揭示其背后全球价值链规则重构的深层博弈,并为推动建设性的全球治理改革提供政策建议。
The surge in exports of China's high-technology products,represented by new energy vehicles,lithium batteries,and photovoltaic products,stems from comparative advantages derived from its complete industrial system,massive market scale,and continuous technological innovation.This growth is driven by rising demand under open economic conditions,not government-subsidized.The recent"overcapacity"allegations leveled against China by the United States and other western countries reflect their strategic anxiety over the rise of China's competitiveness.The underlying motive is an attempt to restrict China's international competitiveness in the new energy sector,thereby preserving their dominant position in global industrial chains.This phenomenon exemplifies major-power rivalry in global economic governance within a context of securitization.From the perspective of global economic governance game,this article utilizes empirical data,including capacity utilization and sales penetration rates,to refute the theoretical fallacies and practical contradictions of the"overcapacity"narrative.It reveals the deeper game of rule restructuring within global value chains and provides policy recommendations for promoting constructive reform of global governance.
作者
陈伟光
张建
CHEN Wei-guang;ZHANG Jian
出处
《改革》
北大核心
2025年第12期129-140,共12页
Reform
基金
教育部创新团队发展计划滚动支持项目“中国参与全球经济治理机制与战略选择”(IRT_17R26)
广东外语外贸大学全球治理与人类命运共同体重点实验室和广东省哲学社会科学创新工程2022年度特别委托项目(GD22TWCXGC12)。
关键词
“产能过剩”
全球价值链
规则博弈
全球经济治理
大国博弈
"overcapacity"
Global Value Chains(GVCs)
rules game
global economic governance
major-power rivalry
