摘要
为了确保资源的有效配置和经济回报,综合能源系统(IES)运营商通过合理的定价机制和激励策略来影响用户行为以实现市场效率、用户满意度和IES运营商经济效益的优化。为此,提出了一种基于双重激励策略的IES主从博弈优化调度模型。首先,针对实际响应中存在的诸多不确定性,提出了基于价格和贡献度的双重激励策略。该策略一方面根据用户参与综合需求响应(IDR)的电负荷,给予阶梯式补贴,另一方面根据参与IDR的电负荷在可调节电负荷中的占比,量化用户的贡献度并给予额外补贴,使得IES运营商在不确定的市场环境中提供更可靠的激励。其次,基于主从博弈理论,建立了以IES运营商为领导者,使其综合利润最大化为目标和以用户为跟随者,使其综合效用最大化为目标的主从博弈优化调度模型,提高了IDR的经济性和可靠性。最后,利用差分进化算法求解了基于博弈均衡的调度策略和激励方案。算例分析结果验证了所提策略能够实现IES经济性和灵活性的双赢。
In order to ensure the effective allocation of resources and economic returns,the operators of integrated energy systems(IES)influence user behavior through reasonable pricing mechanisms and incentive strategies to optimize the market efficiency,the user satisfaction and the economic benefits of IES operators.A stackelberg game-based optimization scheduling model of IES based on a dual incentive strategy is proposed.First,in view of the many uncertainties in the actual response,a dual incentive strategy based on price and contribution is proposed.On the one hand,this strategy gives a step-by-step subsidy according to the amount of electricity load of users participating in integrated demand response(IDR).On the other hand,according to the proportion of electricity load participating in IDR in the total adjustable electricity load,the contribution of users is quantified and additional subsidies are given,so that IES operators can provide more reliable incentives in an uncertain market environment.Secondly,based on the stackelberg game theory,a leader-follower game optimization scheduling model is established with IES operators as leaders and maximizing their comprehensive profits and users as followers and maximizing their comprehensive utility,which improves the economy and reliability of IDR.Finally,the scheduling strategy and incentive scheme based on the game equilibrium are solved by differential evolution algorithm.The results of case study verify that the proposed strategy can achieve a win-win situation of IES economy and flexibility.
作者
倪鉴
沈运帷
NI Jian;SHEN Yunwei(School of Electrical Engineering,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200090,China)
出处
《上海电力大学学报》
2025年第6期531-541,共11页
Journal of Shanghai University of Electric Power
关键词
综合能源系统
主从博弈
双重激励策略
用户响应不确定性
integrated energy system
stackelberg game
dual incentive strategy
user response uncertainty
