摘要
“稳就业”是维持社会经济稳定的首要任务。柔性执法作为“有为政府”与“有效市场”有机结合的一项创新实践,对于优化营商环境、稳定就业具有重要意义。本文将2021年《中华人民共和国行政处罚法》第三十三条“首违不罚”法律制度的确立视为一项柔性执法改革外生冲击,基于2016—2023年新三板中小企业数据和城市罚没收入相关数据,构建强度双重差分模型,实证考察了柔性执法改革对中小企业劳动雇佣的影响。研究发现,对罚没收入依赖度较高,从而受柔性执法改革影响较大的地区,中小企业劳动雇佣规模的扩张更为明显,在经过一系列稳健性检验之后,上述结论依然稳健。机制分析发现,柔性执法改革主要通过缓解企业内(外)源融资约束和优化区域营商环境两种方式促进中小企业劳动雇佣规模的扩大。异质性分析表明,在过往合规记录较好的企业、历史执法强度更高以及财政透明度更低地区的就业释放效应更为凸显,进一步证明了柔性执法改革实施的有效性。拓展研究发现,柔性执法改革有利于企业人力资本结构的升级。
"Employment Stabilization"is a primary prerequisite for socioeconomic stability.As an innovative practice that effectively integrates a"Proactive Government"with an"Efficient Market",flexible law enforcement plays a vital role in optimizing the business environment and stabilizing employment.This paper exploits the establishment of the"No Punishment for First Violation"clause in Article 33 of the 2021 Administrative Penalty Law of the People's Republic of China as an exogenous shock to flexible law enforcement reform.Using data from small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations(NEEQ)from 2016 to 2023,along with urban data on fine and confiscation revenue,we construct a staggered differencein-differences(DID)model to empirically examine the impact of flexible law enforcement reform on labor employment in SMEs.The findings reveal that regions with a higher dependency on administrative fine revenues,and thus more significantly affected by the reform,experienced a more pronounced expansion in the labor hiring scale of SMEs.This conclusion remains robust after a series of robustness checks.Mechanism analysis indicates that the reform primarily fosters employment growth in SMEs by alleviating firms'internal and external financing constraints and optimizing the regional business environment.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the employment effect is more salient for firms with a history of better compliance,in regions with historically stronger law enforcement intensity,and in areas with lower fiscal transparency,further validating the effectiveness of the flexible law enforcement reform.Additional analysis finds that the reform also contributes to the upgrading of corporate human capital structure.
作者
谢浥好
冯帆
代志新
Xie Yihao;Feng Fan;Dai Zhixin
出处
《财政研究》
北大核心
2025年第11期89-108,共20页
Public Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于非威慑因素的助推机制设计:来自随机自然实地实验的证据”(72273145)
中国人民大学“求是学术—栋梁”品牌研究项目“以有为政府赋能有效市场:政府柔性执法改革与中小企业劳动雇佣”。
关键词
首违不罚
劳动雇佣
柔性执法
稳就业
罚没收入依赖
No Punishment for First Violation
Labour Employment
Flexible Law Enforcement
Employment Stabilisation
Dependency on Administrative Fine Revenues
