摘要
针对由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链,考虑制造商和零售商分别进行质量与零售服务投资,研究制造商入侵和零售商需求信息共享策略.基于入侵和信息共享的不同策略组合构建了四个动态博弈模型,给出了不同博弈情形下最优定价和投资水平.通过比较事前期望效用确定了入侵和信息共享条件,利用敏感性分析讨论了模型参数对均衡策略的影响.研究表明:1)当质量敏感系数较大时,零售商将主动共享信息,且在制造商入侵情形下,当渠道替代水平较高(低)时,其共享意愿随着服务敏感系数增大而降低(提高),当渠道替代水平中等时,则随着服务敏感系数增大呈先降低后提高趋势;2)当制造商入侵成本较低时,制造商偏好于入侵,且其入侵动机随着质量敏感系数增大而提高,当服务敏感系数和质量敏感系数均较低时,则随着服务敏感系数增大而提高;3)在一定条件下,制造商可以通过设计补偿支付契约激励零售商共享信息,实现各自利润水平的帕累托改进.
In the context of manufacturer investing in quality and retailer investing in retail service,this paper investigates the encroachment and information sharing decisions in a twolevel supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single brick-and-mortar retailer.Four dynamic game models based on different encroachment and information sharing choices are constructed and then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained.By comparing the firms’ex ante profits,the equilibrium decisions about the encroachment and information sharing are derived,and the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium is also examined through sensitivity analysis.The main results of this paper are as follows.First,when the quality sensitivity coefficient is high,the retailer will proactively share information.If the manufacturer chooses to encroach,the retailer’s willingness to share information decreases(increases)with the service sensitivity coefficient when the channel substitutability is high(low),and first decreases and then increases with the service sensitivity coefficient when the channel substitutability is medium.Second,the manufacturer will choose to encroach when the encroachment cost is low.The manufacturer’s willingness to encroach increases with the quality sensitivity coefficient,and increases with the service sensitivity coefficient when both the service sensitivity coefficient and the quality sensitivity coefficient are low.Third,the manufacturer can induce the retailer to share information by designing a compensation payment incentive contract under certain conditions,which can lead to the Pareto improvements in their respective profit levels.
作者
许明辉
袁睢秋
秦颖
李琳
XU Minghui;YUAN Suiqiu;QIN Ying;LI Lin(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;College of Management Science,Chengdu University of Technology,Chengdu 610059,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
北大核心
2025年第11期3853-3872,共20页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(72171181,72031009)。
关键词
制造商入侵
信息共享
质量投资
零售服务
激励契约
manufacturer encroachment
information sharing
quality investment
retail service
incentive contract
